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CANADA UPDATE: RECENT CHANGES TO
CANADA'S IMMIGRATION LAws; R v.
PROKOFIEW: ARE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
REALLY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?;
CANADA V. GLAXOSMITHKLINE INC.:
TRANSFER PRICING AGREEMENTS
David PaulsonTHIS article begins by briefly considering some of the recent
changes to Canada's immigration laws and their collateral effects.
Next, the case of R. v. Prokofiew is discussed. This recent case
involves an accused's fundamental right to silence. Lastly, through the
lens of Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline, the problematic gray area created by
the current regulations on transfer pricing will be addressed.
I. RECENT CHANGES TO CANADA'S IMMIGRATION LAWS
On June 29, 2012, numerous changes to Canada's Immigration and
Refugee system were passed and received Royal Assent.' The changes
include provisions designed to stop foreign criminals and human traffick-
ers from abusing Canada's immigration system and to expedite the refu-
gee claim process.2
Many of these changes focus on reducing the timeline on several com-
ponents of the immigration system.3 The goal of the changes is ensure
that Canada has a "fair and generous" immigration and refugee program,
while at the same time ensuring "the safety and security of Canadians will
be protected." 4
While the goal of these changes is noble and necessary, there are some
collateral effects. For example, tougher conditions, like a two-year co-
1. News Release, Citizenship & Immigration Canada, Legislation to Protect Ca-
nada's Immigration System Receives Royal Assent (June 29, 2012), http://www.cic.
gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2012/2012-06-29.asp.
2. Id.
3. See Backgrounder - Summary of Changes to Canada's Refugee System, CrnrzEN-
SHIP & IMMIGR. CAN. (June 29, 2012), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/me-
dia/backgrounders/2012/201 2-06-29b.asp (last modified June 29, 2012).
4. News Release, Citizenship & Immigration Canada, supra note 1.
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habitation requirement, have been enacted to help curb marriage fraud.5
Clear evidence of widespread marriage fraud necessitated the stricter
requirements.6
A more controversial collateral effect involves the backlog of applica-
tions. Over the past several years, more applications have been submit-
ted than can be processed.7 As a result, the number of unprocessed
applications has been steadily increasing.8 The backlog is largely caused
by applicants utilizing the Federal Skilled Worker program.9 This is the
group of applicants that will likely suffer the most as a result of collateral
changes to the immigration system.
The reality is clear, but it is also unfortunate. Canada cannot process
all of the applications in its backlog in a reasonable amount of time, and
these backlogged applications are diverting attention from more recent
applicants who may be better qualified under the Federal Skilled Work-
ers program.
The response was simply to delete all applications submitted before
February 27, 2008.10 This change was made through a massive budget
bill, which received Royal Assent on June 29th, 2012."1 Any fees that the
applicants have paid can be returned, and the applicants may reapply.12
Citizenship and Immigration Canada expects that this reduction in the
backlog will affect about 280,000 applicants.13 While this rather draco-
nian approach alleviates the backlog problem, whether it was the best
method remains to be seen.
II. R. V. PROKOFIEW: ARE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REALLY
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
In this case, only one codefendant of two testified. Counsel for the
testifying codefendant asked the jury to consider the silent codefendant's
choice not to testify as evidence of his guilt. In short, he suggested that
innocent people testify and guilty people do not.
5. Ian Robertson, Newlyweds Face Tougher Immigration Measures, TORONTO SUN
(Oct. 26, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://www.torontosun.com/2012/10/26/tougher-immigra-
tion-measures-for-newlyweds-introduced.
6. Id.
7. STANDING COMM. ON CIIZENSII1P & IMMIGRATION, 41s-r PARLIAMENT, IST SESS.,
CUrVING THE Quiui: REDUCING CANADA'S IMMIGRATION BACKLOGS AND WAIT
TIMES 5-8 (Feb. 2012) (authored by David Tilson, M.P.).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Bill C-38, S.C. 2012, c. 19 (Can.) (adding section 87.4 to the Immigration and Refu-
gee Protection Act).
11. Id.
12. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, 87.4(3)-(4) (Can.); No-
tice - Questions and Answers: Bill C-38 and Changes to Federal Skilled Worker
Applications, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.cic.
gc.calenglish/department/media/notices/notice-qa.asp [hereinafter Notice-Ques-
tions and Answers].
13. Notice - Questions and Answers, supra note 12.
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This case interprets a poorly worded provision in the Canada Evidence
Act and finally sheds light on what it really means. But more impor-
tantly, it raises a question. The dissent is not arguing over the meaning of
the Canada Evidence Act, but rather whether these improper arguments
that mislead the jury should result in a new trial for the accused that
chose not to testify.
A. THE FACTS
Before jumping into an analysis of the Court's reasoning, a deeper look
at the facts is necessary. This case was initially brought against three men
charged with a fraudulent tax scheme.14 They were accused of generating
sales tax through fictitious sales of heavy machinery and not remitting the
tax to the government.15 The question for the jury was not whether this
was a fraudulent scheme, but rather "whether [the] accused were aware
of the fraudulent nature of the scheme."i 6
This is important to understand because, of the three original defend-
ants, one defendant, Mr. Tulloch, pleaded guilty prior to trial, and an-
other defendant, Mr. Solty, chose to go to trial and testify.' 7 The third
defendant, Mr. Prokefiew, chose not to testify.18 Mr. Tulloch was a wit-
ness for the Crown, and both Mr. Tulloch and Mr. Solty testified that Mr.
Prokefiew was the mastermind behind the scheme.' 9 The testimony of
the coconspirators provided evidence that Mr. Prokofiew was conducting
this scheme with fraudulent intent, and the strength of the Crown's case
depended on their credibility. 20
The real problem in this case arose when counsel for Mr. Solty argued
that the jury should consider Mr. Prokefiew's silence as evidence of guilt.
Specifically, Mr. Solty's counsel stated,
Peter Solty took the stand and told his story, warts and all. Ewaryst
Prokofiew did not. Mr. Solty accused him of massive monetary
fraud, and backed up that accusation with the hand-written invoices
and other documentation that he provided to the police. What was
Mr. Prokofiew's response? Ask yourself why Ewaryst Prokofiew did
not testify. Did he have something to hide or did he simply have no
response that could help him since there is no point in trying to con-
tradict the truth?21
The trial judge felt these comments undermined Mr. Prokofiew's right
to a fair trial. He believed there was a "significant risk" that the jury
would consider this argument and interpret Mr. Prokofiew's silence as
14. R. v. Prokofiew, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639 at para. 1 (Can.).
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. at para. 107.
18. Id. at para. 1.
19. Id. at para. 107.
20. Id. at para. 106.
21. Id. at para. 51.
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evidence of his guilt.22 The trial judge initially stated that he would pro-
vide the jury with a strong remedial instruction. 23
The following day the trial judge found himself in a conundrum. Fully
aware that there was a significant risk the jury would listen to Mr. Solty's
counsel and use Mr. Prokofiew's silence as evidence of guilt, the judge
determined he was constrained by section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence
Act.24 Section 4(6) states: "The failure of the person charged, or of the
wife or husband of that person, to testify shall not be made the subject of
comment by the judge or by counsel for the prosecution." 25
The confusion is easy to understand. The pertinent section states that
the judge cannot comment on the accused's right to silence. The Court
ruled that the Act does not prohibit the trial court from affirming the
right to silence, but merely prohibits the trial judge from suggesting the
jury consider the silence as evidence of guilt.26 Fully conceding the fact
that a remedial instruction would have been proper in this case, the ma-
jority explained why this was not reversible error.
B. WHY THE MAJORITY ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THIS WAS
HARMLESS ERROR
The majority arrived at its conclusion through a string of assumptions.
First, the majority considered it significant that no one raised the prospect
of severance. 27 The assumption here was that if Mr. Prokofiew's counsel,
or the judge, thought that the risk was so great that the jury would con-
sider the improper argument, they would have severed Mr. Prokofiew's
case from Mr. Solty's. 28
Second, the majority drew the assumption that the reason for not sev-
ering the case was that Mr. Prokofiew's counsel and the trial judge be-
lieved that they could give a proper instruction without actually telling
the jury not to consider Mr. Prokofiew's silence as evidence of guilt.29
Part of this assumption recognized that the counsel for Mr. Prokofiew
argued in his closing that the Crown bore the burden of proof.30
The majority then drew from these facts the assumption that the jury
understood that the Crown bore the burden of proof and therefore also
understood that one's silence is not evidence of guilt.31 Then it followed
this up with a final assumption. The majority recognized that the instruc-
tion advised the jury they should ask the judge if they have any ques-
tions.32 The majority assumed that the jury, which was faced with two
22. Id. at para. 52.
23. Id. at para.13.
24. Id.
25. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, 4(6) (Can.).
26. Prokofiew, [2012] 2 S.C.R., at paras. 3-4.
27. Id. at para. 14.
28. Id. at paras. 14-15.
29. Id.
30. Id. at paras. 16, 19, 23-24.
31. Id. at paras. 21, 24.
32. Id. at para. 17.
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conflicting statements of law, would have asked the judge for clarification
if it was confused.33 The reasoning assumes that, because the jury did not
ask the judge for clarification, the jury must not have been confused and
understood that silence is not evidence of guilt.
The majority's conclusion overlooks the fact that there is no evidence
to suggest this line of reasoning is correct, and that the conclusion is
wholly based on assumption and speculation. Moreover, common sense
requires one to view the statement made by Mr. Solty's counsel as logical.
An ordinary jury would likely consider persuasive the logical fallacy that
if Mr. Prokofiew were innocent he would have said something. The only
thing that might dissuade the jury is a strong remedial instruction from
the judge telling them they cannot consider his silence as evidence of his
guilt.
The dissent's opinion is based upon the simple fact that no one knew
what the jury considered because it was free to consider Mr. Prokofiew's
failure to testify as evidence of guilt.3 4 As the dissent pointed out, trial
judges "must take care to ensure that the right to silence becomes neither
a snare nor a delusion."35
This is not merely a case of an accused being stripped of a fundamental
constitutional right; the right was used to further the case against Mr.
Prokofiew. An erroneous admission of hearsay evidence compounded
this error. 36 While this article has not addressed this portion of the case,
the effect of multiple errors was significant as to why a new trial should
have been granted. But the lack of a remedial instruction was, by itself,
grounds for a new trial.37 Not only did the majority get this wrong, its
opinion had the collateral effect of overruling longstanding precedent
that holds "a trier of fact may not draw an adverse inference from the
accused's failure to testify and that the accused's silence at trial may not
be treated as evidence of guilt."38
C. CONCLUSION
The trial judge was aware of the "significant risk" posed by a lack of a
remedial instruction. Substituting its own judgment, the majority found
the jury probably did not consider Mr. Prokofiew's silence as evidence of
his guilt. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
Any person charged with an offence has the right ... not to be com-
pelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of
the offence . . . [and] to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and
33. Id. at paras. 18-19.
34. Id. at paras. 92.
35. Id. at para. 94 (citing R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874, para. 72).
36. Id. at para. 112.
37. Id.
38. Id. at paras. 64-65 (citing Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874).
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impartial tribunal.39
Interestingly, the majority did not cite to Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms in its entire opinion, it is only cited to by the dissent.40
The question of what rights an accused really has remains unanswered.
It is ironic that the majority interpreted a poorly worded section in the
Canada Evidence Act to be consistent with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, while simultaneously ignoring the Charter's plain
language.
III. CANADA V. GLAXOSMITHKLINE INC: TRANSFER
PRICING AGREEMENTS
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the case of Canada v.
GlaxoSmithKline Inc. While this case is about a vague concept of tax law
called "titled transfer pricing," it is nonetheless quite interesting. This
case demonstrates two things: it shows how simple concepts can be very
difficult to put into practice, and it illustrates how some economic theo-
ries are very elusive when an attempt is made to ground them in reality.
A. TRANSFER PRICING
The case involves a transfer pricing agreement. While the various
methods that are used to calculate a transfer pricing agreement can be
complex and require a fairly adept understanding of economics, the con-
cept itself is simple. Transfer pricing is merely a term used to describe the
prices that related parties use to trade "services, tangible property, and
intangible property . . . across international borders."4 1 For example, if
Amcar, an American car manufacture, is selling cars to its Canadian sub-
sidiary, Cancar, the price that the cars are sold for would be called the
transfer price. 42
The implications of such a transaction are obvious. Because the trans-
action is not an arm's length transaction, the entities could be less focused
on negotiating a reasonable price. Instead, they may be focused on set-
ting up the transaction to ensure that, together, they pay the lowest tax
possible.
The purpose of transfer pricing legislation is to ensure that parties to a
transfer pricing agreement "report substantially the same amount of in-
39. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11, ss. 11(c)-(d) (U.K.).
40. Prokofiew, [2012] 2 S.C.R. at para. 66.
41. CAN. CUSTOMS & RvFENuiE AGFNCY, INTERNATIONAi TRANSFER PRICING, IN-
FORMATION CIRCULAR No. 87-2R, at para. 2 (1999), available at http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic87-2r/ic87-2r-e.pdf [hereinafter INFORMATION CIRCUILAR No.
87-2R].
42. This article cannot, in the limited space provided, explain in any amount of detail
the nuances of transfer pricing. For a more in-depth introduction to Canadian
Transfer Pricing, see Mark Kirkey, An Introduction to Transfer Pricing in Canada:
Avoiding Double Taxation, GOWLINGs 76-80, http://www.gowlings.com/resources/
PublicationPDFs/KirkeyIntroTransfer.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
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come as they would if they had been dealing with each other at arm's
length." 4 3 Canada's legislation embraces the arm's length principle. The
reasonableness of the transaction is judged by whether the agreement
would be substantially the same if the parties would not have been re-
lated entities and the transaction had, instead, been an arm's length
deal.44
The concept is not new. Since 1939, Canada's Income Tax Act has pro-
vided that a company involved in transfer pricing may be reassessed the
difference between the price paid and the price that would have been
paid if the transaction had been made at arm's length. 4 5 The statute that
was applicable to the reassessment years in Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline
Inc. states:
Where a taxpayer has paid or agreed to pay to a non-resident person
with whom the taxpayer was not dealing at arm's length as price,
rental, royalty or other payment for or for the use or reproduction of
any property, or as consideration for the carriage of goods or passen-
gers or for other services, an amount greater than the amount (in this
subsection referred to as "the reasonable amount") that would have
been reasonable in the circumstances if the non-resident person and
the taxpayer had been dealing at arm's length, the reasonable
amount shall, for the purpose of computing the taxpayer's income
under this Part, be deemed to have been the amount that was paid or
is payable therefor. 4 6
While the concept of transfer pricing regulation is simple, the mechan-
ics of these types of transactions are extremely complex. Dealing with
the potential enforcement of transfer pricing regulations can be very
costly for companies that are selected for examination.47 This is widely
regarded as a gray area of tax law.4 8 The Canada Revenue Agency recog-
nizes this and states, "transfer pricing is not an exact science." 49 Despite
the difficulty and seeming subjectivity of auditing a transfer pricing agree-
ment, audits do occur and cases like GlaxoSmithKline arise.
Ever since the global recession began, the number of these audits ap-
pears to be on the rise.50 With less tax revenue available, countries ap-
pear to be growing more aggressive in auditing transfer pricing
agreements and seeking to increase their tax revenue through these
43. INFORMATION CIRCUsAR No. 87-2R, supra note 41, at para. 7.
44. Id.
45. Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., [2012] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. 1 (Can.).
46. Id. at para. 18 (quoting Section 69(2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I (5th
Supp.)). While applicable to this case, Section 69(2) has since been repealed and
replaced by Section 247(2) of the Income Tax Act.
47. See, e.g., Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson, Clearing Away the Sand: Ret-
rospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57
TAX L. REV. 37, 113 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Tammy Whitehouse, Tax Collectors Start Circling on Transfer Pricing, 7
COMPLIANCE WEEK 73 (Feb. 2010).
49. INFORMATION CIRCULAR No. 87-2R, supra note 41, at para. 34.
50. Whitehouse, supra note 48.
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audits.51
Canada recognizes several different methods to determine if the trans-
fer price is what would have resulted from an arm's length agreement. 52
While there is not an explicit hierarchy of the methods, it is generally
recognized that the taxpayer must use the most appropriate method in
determining whether the transfer price is substantially the same as an
arm's length price would have been.53 This is a main cause of confusion.
As the following case illustrates, the methods can be manipulated not
only by the taxpayer, but also by the auditor.
B. THE FACTS OF CANADA v. GLAxoSmiTHKLINE INC. AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S RULING
In this case, Glaxo Group was selling a licensing agreement to GlaxoS-
mithKline Inc. ("Glaxo Canada") and requiring the Canadian subsidiary
to purchase the active ingredient for Zantac from an approved supplier. 54
The approved supplier was also a subsidiary of Glaxo Group.55 Other
generic pharmaceutical companies purchased the active ingredient in the
drug in arms-length transactions from other suppliers. 56
The contention arose when the tax assessor realized that the non-affili-
ated companies who were purchasing the active ingredient were doing so
in arm's length transactions for between $194 and $304 per kilogram. But
Glaxo Canada was purchasing the active ingredient from a related com-
pany for $1,500 per kilogram.57 Superficially, Glaxo Canada's transfer
price would appear to be an artificially inflated price that would not have
resulted if they were dealing at arm's length with the supplier. But this is
only the case if the supply price is considered in isolation.
In reality, Glaxo Canada was required to purchase the active ingredient
in accordance with the licensing agreement.58 The licensing agreement,
among several other things, granted Glaxo Canada the right to market
the drug under the name Zantac.59 The tax assessor did not agree that
this was a factor that should be considered, but instead argued that the
transaction should be viewed in isolation.60 The Tax Court largely agreed
with the assessor and upheld the reassessment.61
The specific methods are beyond the scope of this paper, but an under-
standing of these different methods is not necessary to comprehend that
the tax assessor was wrong in this case. It is common knowledge that
Zantac, like all name brand pharmaceuticals, sells for a higher price than
51. Id.
52. INFORMATION CIRCULAR No. 87-2R, supra note 41, at para. 48.
53. Id. at para. 49.
54. GlaxoSmithKline, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at paras. 4, 9.
57. See id. at paras. 8, 9.
58. Id. at paras. 49, 50.
59. Id. at para. 7.
60. GlaxoSmithKline, [2012] 3 S.C.R. at para. 11.
61. Id. at para. 12.
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its generic counterpart. The rights conferred by the licensing agreement
are without question a part of the price at which the active ingredient was
being sold to Glaxo Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada understood this, as did the Federal
Court of Appeal, and held that the licensing agreement should be consid-
ered in determining whether the transfer price was reasonable. 62 The Su-
preme Court offered a small amount of guidance before remanding the
matter to the Tax Court for reassessment.
The Court reminded the tax court that this was not an "exact science"
and the reassessment should reflect business realities. 63 While con-
ducting the reassessment, the tax court should consider a broad range of
circumstances as well as the respective roles of Glaxo Canada and Glaxo
Group. 64 Glaxo Group is the owner of the intellectual property, and
Glaxo Canada is a secondary manufacturer. 65 The Court appeared to be
suggesting that, if Glaxo Group bore more risk in developing the product,
this risk may be reflected in a higher profit margin and this should be
taken into consideration.
The Court also pointed out that the statute uses the term "reasonable
amount." 66 The statute allows for reassessment only when the transfer
price is higher than what a "reasonable amount" paid would have been
had the transaction been an arm's length deal. 6 7 The only question
should be: could this be a reasonable price if this were an arm's length
deal.
C. CONCLUSION
The decision was correct, and the advice the Court gave should not be
ignored, but the advice of the Court lacks specificity. This is not a failing
by the Court, but rather an indication of just how uncertain this area of
taxation is. Further, this case reveals a significant factor in transfer pric-
ing. Specifically, that it is not realistic for one to ascertain an arm's length
price in a non-arm's length deal. Alternatives need to be developed. Ca-
nada does offer the ability for a company to enter into an advance pricing
agreement, whereby the transfer price would essentially be preapproved
by the Canada Revenue Agency. But the average time required to com-
plete a bilateral advance pricing agreement is currently reported to be
forty-nine months.68
62. Id. at paras. 14-16, 60.
63. Id. at para. 61.
64. Id. at paras. 61, 62.
65. Id. at para. 62.
66. Id. at paras. 61, 64.
67. Id. at para. 18 (quoting Section 69(2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th
Supp.)).
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Companies incur a number of costs to ensure compliance with transfer
pricing regulations, and those costs rise sharply if the company is au-
dited.69 But these costs are not just allocated to the company. The gov-
ernment also incurs heavy costs to prosecute cases involving transfer
pricing violations.70 The end result is economists arguing over something
that is, to a large extent, subjective.
As the number of multinational companies continues to increase, the
idea of tax dollars going to pay for an army of government economists
grows more unappealing. Despite the seeming impossibility, a safe har-
bor should be considered, for the benefit of both companies and
taxpayers.
The problems with transfer pricing regulations are not confined to Ca-
nada, and the issues implicated by the current system of transfer pricing
need to be addressed on a global level. Thankfully, a system of safe
harbors may soon be coming from the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).71 This possibility is partially moti-
vated by the increasing enforcement costs of the various statutory re-
gimes.72 Until the safe harbors are in place, every multinational company
should aggressively fight reassessments. Perhaps by keeping enforcement
costs high, a better and more reasonable method will emerge.
69. See, e.g., Durst & Culbertson, supra note 47.
70. Id.
71. Patricia Gimbel Lewis, United States: Safe at Last? Transfer Pricing Safe Harbors
On The Horizon, 21 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING RiP. 9, 1 (2012).
72. Id.
